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6.1 Introduction
A fundamental issue in the study of capital structure is how securities
issued by firms are valued in the financial markets. Typical corporate
capital structures contain many individual securities, which in themselves
are complicated by numerous covenants and indenture provisions. In
addition, the valuation of any individual security must consider complex
interactions among different claims. The corporate liability pricing model
derived in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) represents a
theoretical breakthrough on this problem, with potentially significant
practical applications. The critical insight of their model is that every
security is a contingent claim on the value of the underlying firm. Hence
these securities can be priced via an arbitrage logic which is independent
of the equilibrium structure of risk and return. Every security must obey a
general equation which depends only on riskless interest rates, the mar-
ket value of the entire firm, and its volatility. The model distinguishes
among securities via boundary conditions which correspond to covenants
and indenture provisions. Since all of these data are directly observable
or can be readily estimated, the model can be used to predict actual
market prices.
Although this model has been the premier theory of how value is
allocated among claimants on firms for almost a decade, its empirical
validity remains an open question. Ingersoll has tested the model's ability
to predict prices for dual purpose funds (1976) and to predict call policies
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for convertible bonds (1977). But we know of no test of the model in its
presumably most important application, namely, the valuation of debt
and equity in typical corporate capital structures. In addition to being of
academic interest, such a test has significant practical implications. If it
can be established that the model predicts actual market prices, then the
model can be used to price new and untraded claims, to infer firm values
from prices of traded claims like equity, and to price covenants sepa-
rately.
In this paper evidence is presented on how well a model which makes
the usual assumptions in the literature does in predicting market prices
for claims in standard capital structures. The goal is to examine the
predictive power of this prototypical model. The results suggest that the
usual assumption list requires modification before it can serve as a basis
for valuing corporate claims.
The usual assumptions made in the contingent claims valuation litera-
ture, for example, Ingersoll (1976, 1977), are as follows:
(A. 1) Perfect markets: The capital markets are perfect with no transac-
tions costs, no taxes, and equal access to information for all
investors.
(A.2) Continuous trading.
(A.3) Ito dynamics: The value of the firm, V, satisfies the stochastic
differential equation.
dV = (aV - C)dt + vVdz
where total cash outflow per unit time C is locally certain, a and
a
2 are the instantaneous expected rate of return and variance of
return on the underlying assets.
(A.4) Constant a
2.
(A.5) Nonstochastic term structure: The instantaneous interest rate
r(t) is a known function of time.
(A.6) Shareholder wealth maximization: Management acts to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth.
(A.7) Perfect bankruptcy protection: Firms cannot file for protection
from creditors except when they are unable to make required
cash payments. In this case perfect priority rules govern the
distribution of assets to claimants.
(A.8) Perfect antidilution protection: No new securities (other than
additional common equity shares) can be issued until all existing
nonequity claims are extinguished. Deals between equity and
subsets of other claimants are prohibited.
(A.9) Perfect liquidity: Firms can sell assets as necessary to make cash
payouts, with no loss in total value.
Translating this set of assumptions into an explicit model for valuing
claims in a typical capital structure is considerably more difficult than
suggested by previous examples in the literature. A common capital241 Contingent Claims Valuation
structure consists of equity and multiple issues of callable nonconvertible
sinking fund coupon debt. This differs from the standard example of a
single issue of nonconvertible debt, due to Merton (1974), because of
both the sinking fund and multiple issue features. One effect of sinking
funds is to reduce the effective maturity of debt. Another effect, due to
the option to retire at market or par (with or without an option to double
the sinking fund payment), is to make debt more like equity. Multiple
issues of debt introduce interactions among issues of debt, so that max-
imizing the value of equity need not be equivalent to minimizing the value
of a given issue of debt, as in the single debt issue case. One accomplish-
ment of this paper is to translate the usual assumption list into a model for
realistic capital structures.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 6.2 presents a theoretical
analysis of the valuation problem for a firm with equity and multiple
issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, based on the
usual assumption list. Section 6.3 describes the empirical methodology,
including numerical analysis techniques, sample data, and testing proce-
dure. Section 6.4 presents an analysis of the results, and Section 6.5 gives
a conclusion.
6.2 Theory
The theoretical basis of the corporate liability pricing model is de-
veloped in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). They use an
arbitrage argument to show that corporate liabilities which are functions
of the value of the firm and time obey a partial differential equation which
depends on the known schedule of interest rates r = r(t) and the variance
rate of firm value a
2, as well as on payouts and indentures on claims, but
does not depend on expected returns on assets and liabilities of the firm.
Nor does it depend on any equilibrium structure of risk and return.
Readers are referred to these papers for a derivation of the basic partial
differential equation.
A starting point for the analysis of realistic capital structures is the
standard example of contingent claims valuation as applied to noncon-
vertible corporate bonds, namely the formulation in Merton (1974) of a
callable coupon bond with no sinking fund. Merton shows that the equity
E(V, t) is a firm with one issue of such debt obeys the following partial
differential equation and boundary conditions.
(la) 0 = Viv
2V
2Evv + (rV - cP - d)Ev + Et-rE + d
£(0, 0 = 0
E(V, f*) = max(0, V - P)
E(V, t) = V-k{t)P
EV(V, r) = l,242 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason /Eric Rosenfeld
where P = P(t) is the outstanding bond principal at time t, c is the coupon
rate per unit principal, k(t) is the call price schedule per unit principal,
d = d(V, i) is the known dividend policy, and t* is the maturity date of the
bond. The upper free boundary, V(t), corresponds to the optimal call
barrier at or above which the firm will call the bonds. Similarly, Merton
shows that the valuation problem for the debt issue D(V, t) can be
formulated as follows:
(lb) 0 = V2u
2V
2Dvv + (rV - cP - d)Dv + Dt- rD + cP
D(0, 0 = 0
D{V, r*) = min(V, P)
D(V, t) = k(t)P
DV(V, 0 = 0.
The plan for section 6.2 is as follows. Section 6.2.1 generalizes the
analysis of callable nonconvertible coupon bonds to allow for sinking
funds, with and without noncumulative) options to double the sinking
fund payment. Sinking funds are important because they dramatically
decrease the effective maturity of bonds and because the option to sink at
market or par makes bonds more like equity than otherwise. Section
6.2.2 then generalizes the analysis to deal with multiple issues of callable
nonconvertible sinking fund coupon bonds. The ultimate contingent
claims formulation of this valuation problem will bear only a generic
resemblance to equations (la) and (lb).
6.2.1 Sinking Funds
Most issues of corporate debt specify the mandatory retirement of
bonds via periodic sinking fund payments. Typically the firm is required
to retire a specified fraction of the initial bonds each period. Generally
the firm has the option to redeem these bonds through either of two
mechanisms: (1) it can purchase the necessary bonds in the market and
deliver them to the trustee or (2) it can choose the necessary bonds by lot
and retire them by paying the standard principal amount to their owners.
Often the firm also has the option to double the number of bonds retired
each period if it wishes. Hence the firm faces the following choices each
period: (1) Should the bonds be called? (2) Assuming the bonds are not
called, should the mandatory number of bonds be sunk at market or par?
(3) Assuming the bonds are not called, should the sinking fund payment
be doubled? (If this option exists.)
First, we consider the contingent claims formulation of this problem
where the firm has no option to double the sinking fund payment. Next
the option to double is introduced.243 Contingent Claims Valuation
Sinking Funds with No Option to Double. Suppose that the firm de-
cides not to call its debt and has no option to double. Then it must decide
whether to sink bonds at market or par. Since the only difference is in the
cash payout involved, and since higher firm value implies higher equity
value, management will choose whichever costs less. For any given r(t), if
the firm value is relatively low, then debt will trade below par and the firm
will choose to sink at market. And, for some r(t), if firm value is relatively
high, then debt will trade above par and the firm will choose to sink at par.
Consider the stylized case of a continuous sinking fund. Let s be the
rate at which bonds are sunk, and let P(t) = P(0) - st be the remaining
principal assuming the bonds have not been called. Then 7 (t) = s I P{i) is
the fractional rate at which bonds are sunk. If debt trades below par, then
total sinking fund payments are yD(V, t) where 7 = y(t). If debt trades
above par, then total sinking fund payments are yP = s. Hence a general
expression for total sinking fund payments is 7 min (D, P). Thus the
contingent claims formulation of the valuation problem for equity in the
presence of a single issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon
debt, with no option to double, is
(2a) 0 = V2d
2V
2Evv + [rV - 7 min (D, P) - cP - d]Ev
+ Et-rE + d
E(0, f) = 0
E(V, f*) = max(0, V - P)
E(V, i) = V-kP
EV(V, 0 = 1.
Similarly, from (lb), the contingent claims formulation of the valua-
tion problem for debt in this capital structure is
(2b) 0 = V2d
2V
2Dvv + [rV - 7 min (D, P) - cP - d]Dv
+ Dt - rD + 7 min {D, P) + cP
D(0, 0 = 0
D(V, t*) = min(V, P)
D(V, t) = kP
DV(V, 0 = 0.
In summary, the valuation problem for a capital structure with equity
and a single issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt,
with no option to double, divides into three regions of firm value as a
function of time. One region is defined by the fact that debt trades below244 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
par. This region corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue to firm
values where bankruptcy occurs. A "par barrier" separates this region
from the one above. The region above lies between the par barrier sand
the call barrier, so that debt trades between par and the call price. Since
the call barrier converges to par at the maturity of the debt issue, this
region converges to a point. The third region lies above the call barrier. It
corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue to firm values where bank-
ruptcy does not occur.
Sinking Funds with an Option to Double. Most sinking funds give the
firm an option to double the sinking fund payments. This section deals
with noncumulative options to double, where the right to double is
unaffected by past doubling decisions. There also exist cumulative op-
tions to double, where the right to double is affected by past decisions.
Given the option to double the sinking fund payment, the actual principal
that will be outstanding at any future date is unknown. Hence the values
of equity and debt can no longer be written as functions of firm value and
time alone. However, the following theorem says that these values can be
written as functions of firm value, current principal, and time:
THEOREM 1: Assume that the optimal retirement rate, P(V, P, t), for
bonds can be expressed as a deterministic function of firm value, current
principal, and time. Then equity and debt and functions E(V, P, i) and
D(V, P, t) that obey the following partial differential equations:
(3a) 0 = Via
2 V
2EVV + [rV - 7 *min (D, P) - cP - d]Ev- 7 *PEP
+ Et-rE + d
(3b) 0 = Vi(r
2V
2Dvv + [rV- 7*min (D, P) - cP - d]Dv -y*PDP
+ Dt-rD + y*min (D, P) + cP
where7*(V, P, t)=-P/P.
Proof: Apply Ito's lemma to E(V, P, t) and D(V, P, t), noting that P is
locally certain. Substitute this into the standard arbitrage proof given in
Merton (1974). Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 provides a valuation logic once the optimal policy with
respect to doubling the sinking fund payment has been determined.
Consider the decision whether to double the current sinking fund pay-
ment, assuming that management acts optimally thereafter. Suppose that
the sinking fund payment is not doubled, so that the fraction of bonds
retired is ydt = sdt/P. Let V and P be firm value and current principal
before the sinking fund payment. Hence the value of equity after the
sinking fund payment is E[V - min (D, P)ydt, (1 - ydi)P, t\. Suppose
alternatively that the sinking fund payment is doubled. By analogy the
value of equity after the sinking fund payment is E [V — 2 min (D, P)ydt,
(1 — 2 ydt)P, t\. The difference between the two equity values is thus245 Contingent Claims Valuation
[min. (D, P), Ev + PEP]ydt. If the bracketed expression is positive, the
firm should not double the sinking fund payment; otherwise it should.
Since min (D, P) is less than the call price kP, doubling the sinking fund
payment is a cheap way of calling a fraction of the bonds. Hence there will
be a "doubling barrier" V(P, t) which lies below the call barrier V(P, t).
The firm will double the sinking fund payment above the doubling barrier
but not below it. The firm is indifferent between doubling and not
doubling right at the barrier; hence the expression we just derived
vanishes at the barrier. Using this logic in (3a), the contingent claims
formulation of the valuation problem for equity in the presence of a single
issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, with a noncu-
mulative option to double, is as follows:
(4a) 0 = V2(T
2V
2EVV + [rV-ymin(D, P) - cP - d]Ev - yPEP
+ Et-rE + d, 0<V<V(P, t)
0 = V2u
2V
2Evv + [rV - 27min(D, P) - cP - d]Ev - 2yPEP
+ Er-rE+d, V(P, t)<V<V(p, i)
E(0, P, i) = 0
E(V, 0, t) = V
E(V, P, ?*) = max(0, V - P)
min [D{V, P, t), P]EV(V, P, t) + PEP(V, P, t) = 0
E(V, P, t) = V-kP
EV(V, P,t) = l.
ontingent claims formulation of the valuation problem for debt in this
capital structure is
(4b) 0 = V2d
2V
2Dvv + [rV - 7min (D, P) - cP - d]Dv - yPDP




2Dvv + [rV - 27mm (D, P) - cP - d]Dv - 2yPDP
+ DL- rD + 27min(D, P) + cP
for V{P, t)<V<V{P, t)
D(0, P,t) = 0
D(V, 0,t) = 0
D(V, P, f*) = min(V, P)
min [D(V, P, t), P] [DV{V, P, t) - 1] + PDP{V, P, t) = Q
D{V, P, t) = kP
DV(V, P, 0-0.246 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
Actual sinking fund indentures cause claims to be nonhomogeneous
functions of firm value and current principal. The reason is that the
fractional rate at which bonds are retired (7 or 27 where 7 = sIP) grows
as current principal declines. However, there is a reasonable approxima-
tion to actual sinking fund indentures that simplifies the analysis and
leads to additional insights. Namely, assume that the fractional rate at
which bonds must be sunk is 7, a constant, or 27 if the sinking fund
payment is doubled. In effect this assumes that the current decision
whether to double the sinking fund payment does not affect permitted
future fractional rates at which bonds are sunk.
This assumption plus the assumption that dividends are proportional to
firm value reduce the dimensionality of the equations in (4a) and (4b).
Consider standardized values for firm value (x = V/P), equity (f=E/P),
and debt (g = D/P); and define the proportional dividend rate as 8 = dl V.
Substituting these into (4a) and using the new assumptions, the following
standardized formulation
(5a) 0 = V2<J
2x
2fxx + [(r + 7 - h)x - 7mm(g, 1) - c]fx
0 = V2<r
2x
2fxx + [(r + 27 - b)x - 27 - c]fx
+ ft- (r + 27)/+ bx, x (t)<x<x(t)
/(o, 0 = 0
fix, t*) = max (0, x - 1)
(l-x)fx(x,t)+f{x,t) = 0
f(x, t)=x-k
Note that this implies a doubling barrier which lies between the par
barrier and the call barrier, so that the firm is always sinking at par if it
doubles the sinking fund payment. To see that this is so, reconsider the
expression derived before, namely, min (D, P)EV + PEP. Suppose that
the debt is trading below par, so that this expression is DEV + PEP =
(V + E) Ev — PEP. Under the new assumptions, equity is a
homogeneous function of firm value and current principal. Hence by
Euler's condition E = VEV + PEP. Substituting this into the expression
gives E{\ — Ev) > 0, which says that the sinking fund payment should
not be doubled.
Similarly, using (4b), debt is proportional to a standardized solution,
g(x, t), where247 Contingent Claims Valuation
(5b) 0 = V2v
2x
2gxx + [(r + 7 - 8)* - 7min(g, 1) - c]gx
+ gt~ (r + y)g + ymin(ymm(g, 1) + c, 0<x<x(t)
0 = V2 + u
2x
8xx + [(r + 2 7 - b)x - 27 - c]gx + gt
- (r + 27)g + 27 + c, x (t)<x<x(t)
g(0, 0 = 0
g(x, t*) = min(x, 1)
{l-x)gx{x,t)+g{x, 0-1 = 0
In summary, the valuation problem for a capital structure with equity
and a single issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt,
with a noncumulative option to double, divides into four regions of firm
value as a function of time. One region is defined by the fact that debt
trades below par. In this region bonds are sunk at market and sinking
fund payments are not doubled. This region corresponds at the maturity
of the debt issue to firm values where bankruptcy occurs. A second region
lies between the par barrier and the doubling barrier. In this region bonds
are sunk at par and sinking fund payments are not doubled. A third
region lies between the doubling barrier and the call barrier. In this
region bonds are sunk at par and sinking fund payments are doubled.
Since the call barrier converges to par at the maturity of the debt issue,
both the second and third regions coverage to a point. The fourth region
lies above the call barrier. It corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue
to firm values where bankruptcy does not occur. For some given r(t), k{t),
and c, it is possible that debt will always trade below par. Thus bonds are
always sunk at market and the sinking fund payment is never doubled. In
these cases there is only one region, since the par barrier, doubling
barrier and the call barrier do not exist.
Unfortunately, incorporating the option to double the sinking fund
payment in a capital structure with numerous debt issues dramatically
increases the dimensionality of the valuation problem. Therefore the
option to double is ignored in the numerical approximations. The results
in this section imply that this leads to underpricing of equity and the
overpricing of debt.
6.2.2 Multiple Debt Issues
This section generalizes the analysis to allow for multiple debt issues.
This feature of debt is important because it introduces interactions among
bonds that are not present in the standard example of one debt issue. For248 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
expositional simplicity, this section considers the case of two issues of
callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt (with no options to
double).
The value of any remaining claims in a capital structure initially com-
posed of equity and two issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund
coupon debt, with no options to double, will depend on whether either
debt issue has been redeemed via a call decision, as well as on firm value
and time. In effect the capital structure of the firm can be in any one of
four states, which is indexed by the variable 0. If there are n debt issues
then there are 2" such states. 0 = 0 in the state where both issues of debt
have been previously called. The valuation problem in this state is trivial;
equity value equals firm value. 0 = 1 is the state where bond 1 is alive but
bond 2 has been called. 0 = 2 is the state where bond 2 is alive but bond 1
has been called. Finally, 0 = 3 is the state where neither bond has been
called.
With this notation the values of claims can be written as functions of the
current capital structure state as well as firm value and time. Letting E(V,
0, t) D(V, 0,0, and D' (V, 0, i) be the values of equity and the two debt
issues, they obey the following system of partial differential equations in
any relevant capital structure state:
(6a) 0 = VKJ
2V
2EVV + (rV - IT - IT' -d)Ev + Et-rE + d;
0 = 1,2,3
(6b) 0 = V2(T
2V
2DVV + (rF- TT - ir' - d)Dv+Dt-rD + TT;
0 = 1,3
(6c) 0 = V2<T
2V
2D'VV + (rV- TT - ir' - d)D'v + D't - rD' + IT';
0 = 2,3.
IT and IT' are simply total cash payouts to the two debt issues. Taking
account of whether bonds have been called and whether it makes sense to
sink at market or par,
ir(V, 1, 0 = TT(V, 3, t) = ymin(D, P) + cP
TT'(V, 2, t) = ir'(V, 3, 0 = Vmin(Z); P') + c'P'
ir'(V, 1,0 = 0.
Note how current values of debt issues enter into valuation equations for
other claims. Hence equations (6a)-(6c) must generally be solved simul-
taneously. It is always possible to eliminate one relevant equation, since
the claims sum to firm value.
Boundary conditions are needed to relate the solutions to (6a), (6b),249 Contingent Claims Valuation
and (6c) for different capital structure states to each other and to com-
plete the contingent claims formulation of the general valuation problem.
For each relevant security in each state a lower boundary condition, a
terminal boundary condition, and an upper (free) boundary condition
must be specified. The lower boundary condition in every case is trivial;
limited liability translates zero firm value into zero value for every claim:
#(o, e, o = D(O, e, t) = D'(o, 0,0 = 0.
Each state has a unique terminal boundary. Let t* be the maturity of
debt issue D and let t*' be the maturity of debt issue D'. Without loss of
generality t* < /*'. First suppose that the firm is in capital structure state
8 = 1, where the second debt issue has been called. Then the terminal
boundary coincides with the maturity of the first debt issue. The terminal
boundary condition in this case is standard for a capital structure with a
single issue of callable nonconvertible coupon debt:
E(V, 1, t*) = max[0, V-P(t*)]
,t*) = min[V,P(t*)].
Next suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 9 = 2, where the
first debt issue has been called. Then the terminal boundary coincides
with the maturity of the second debt issue. Again the terminal boundary
condition is standard:
E(V, 2, t*) = max[0, V-P'(t*')]
D'(V,2, f*') = min[V, P'(t*')].
Finally, suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 0 = 3, where
neither debt issue has been called. Then the terminal boundary coincides
with the earlier maturity date, since the firm must transit to a new capital
structure state on this date. In the example the first debt issue matures at
t*. Since the debt is callable, the only relevant region has to do with firm
values which are insufficient to cover the remaining principal on the first
debt issue, so that the firm is bankrupt. Since firm value is insufficient to
meet principal payments on the first debt issue alone, equity is worthless
in this region: E(V, 3, t*) = 0. The value of the two debt issues in this
region depends on seniority. If the first issue is senior, then
D(V, 3, t*) = V
D'(V, 3, t*) = 0.
If the second issue is senior, then
D(V, 3, r*) = max[0, V - P'(t*)]
D'(V,3, t*) = min[V, P'(t*)].
Finally, if neither issue is senior, then both get pro rata shares:250 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
D(V, 3, t*) = VP(t*)/[P(t*) + P'(t*)]
D' (V, 3, t*) = VP' (t*)/[P(t*) + P'(t*)].
It remains to specify upper free boundary conditions corresponding to
optimal call decisions in each of the capital structure states. First suppose
that the firm is in capital structure states 6 = 1, where the second debt
issue has been called. The upper free boundary conditions in this case are




Similarly, if the firm is in capital structure state 6 = 2, where the first debt
issue has been called, then the conditions are
E[V(2,t),2,t] = V(2,t)-k'(t)P'(t)
Ev[V(2,t),2,t] = l.
Finally, suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 6 = 3, where
both debt issues are alive. The upper free boundary in this state corre-
sponds to the barrier where the firm calls one of the bond issues and thus
transits to another state. Since management chooses the bond to call so as
to maximize shareholder wealth,
E[V(3, t), 3, t] = max{£[V(3, 0 - k{t)P{t), 2, t],
E[V(3,t)-k'(t)P'(t),l,t]}.
Similarly the "high contact" optimization condition is
EV[V(3, t), 3, t] = dmax£[V(3, 0 - k(t)P(t), 2, t],
E[V(3,t)-k'(t)P'(t),l,t]/dV
Suppose that it is optimal to call the first debt issue at V(3, t), then the
values of the debt issues on this barrier are
D[V(3, t), 3, t] = k(t)P(t)
D'[V(3, t), 3, t] = D'[V(3, t) - k{t)P{t), 2, t].
Conversely suppose that it is optimal to call the second debt issue, then
D[V(3, t), 3, t] = D[V(3, t) - k'(t)P'(t), 1, t]
D'[V(3,t),3,t] = k'(t)P'(t).
In summary, the valuation problem for capital structures containing
equity and two issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt
corresponds to the simultaneous solution of a system of partial differen-251 Contingent Claims Valuation
tial equations. Appropriate combinatorial application of these principles
leads directly to a formulation of the valuation problem for capital
structures containing equity and n issues of callable nonconvertible sink-
ing fund coupon debt. This approach is necessitated by the fundamental
problem of determining the optimal call policy governing the n callable
bonds. This formulation identifies that policy which maximizes the value
of the equity.
It is important to understand the dimensionality of the n issue case.
First note that there are 2
n possible capital structure states, including the
trivial state of an all-equity firm. Furthermore, there are a number of
securities to be value in each state. One way to calculate the number of
different solutions to partial differential equations required in the n issue
case is as follows. There are (£) = 1 capital structure states corresponding
to 0 bonds having been called. In this one state there are n + 1 securities
outstanding for a total of n + 1 solutions. There are ("_i) = n capital
structure states corresponding to one bond's having been called. In each
of these n states there are n securities outstanding. Continuing in this
way, we find that there are 2/LTo
1 (n -/) (n + 1 - j) solutions in all. Hence
one high priority line of research in terms of applying contingent claims
valuation to realistic capital structures is the derivation of rational
theorems which rule out various capital structure states (e.g., which show
that certain kinds of bonds are always called first.
6.3 Data and Methodology
Data were collected for 15 firms on a monthly basis from January 1975
to January 1981. The firms were chosen based on a number of criteria at
the beginning of 1975:
1. Simple capital structures (i.e., one class of stock, no convertible
bonds, small number of debt issues, no preferred stock).
2. Small proportion of private debt to total capital.
3. Small proportion of short-term notes payable or capitalized leases
to total capital.
4. All publicly traded debt is rated.
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The contingent claims valuation model requires three kinds of data in
order to solve for prices of individual claims as functions of total firm
value: (1) indenture data, (2) variance rate data, and (3) interest rate
data. The bond indentures define the boundary conditions which consti-
tute the economic description of various claims. For example, the follow-
ing data were collected for each bond for each firm: principal, coupon
rate, call price schedule, call protection period, sinking fund payments,
and options to sink at market or par. The bond convenant data were
collected from Moody's Bond Guide, except that sinking fund payments
were collected from the monthly Standard and Poor's Bond Guide. For
purposes of testing the model, actual bond prices were also collected
from the latter sources.
The following procedure was used to estimate a variance rate for each
firm in the sample, as of each January from 1977 through 1981. For each
of the trailing 24 months, we calculated the percentage return on the total
of all claims, including any payouts, that were outstanding at the begin-
ning of the month. (To estimate the market value of nontraded debt, we
assumed that the ratio of market value to book value was the same as for
traded debt.) The sample variance of this percentage return gives an
estimate of the variance rate for the firm as a whole. Table 6.1 summa-
rizes the estimates.
The standard assumption in contingent claims analysis is that the future
course of interest rates, r(t), is known. Specifically, it is often assumed
that the instantaneous rate of interest is constant through time (i.e., a flat
term structure). The assumption of a flat term structure results in a
fundamental problem for the empirical test of the contingent claims
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model. If a flat term structure is assumed then the model will misprice
riskless bonds. Therefore the test of whether contingent claims analysis
can price risky bonds is systematically flawed. This problem is handled by
the assumption that the future course of the one-year rate of interest will
be consistent with the one-year forward interest rates implied by the
current term structure. This procedure will result in the correct pricing of
riskless bonds. The following procedure was used to estimate implied
one-year forward interest rates for 25 years, as of each January from 1977
through 1982. First, identify all par government bonds as of that date.
These data were gathered from the Wall Street Journal. There are usually
fewer than 25 such bonds. Therefore linear interpolation was used to
complete a 25-year yield curve for par government bonds. Then this yield
curve was solved for implied one-year forward rates. Hence the implied
forward rates pertain to a par term structure.
The method of Markov chains is used to approximate solutions to the
problems posed in the previous section. Parkinson (1977), Mason (1978),
and Cox et al. (1979) use Markov chains to approximate solutions to
valuation problems similar to the ones considered in this paper. The
method of finite differences has been used by Brennan and Schwartz
(1916a, 19766) to treat similar contingent claims equations. The methods
of Markov chains and finite differences are very similar, as demonstrated
in Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and Mason (1978). Readers are referred
to these papers for background on numerical analysis techniques.
If all claims are publicly traded, then the value of the firm can be
observed and prices for all claims, relative to the observed firm value, can
be predicted. However, since all claims on the test firms are not publicly
traded, an alternative approach had to be taken. Namely, the equity
pricing function was used to estimate firm value. In other words, what
firm value is consistent with the actual equity value? Then this estimated
firm value was used to predict debt prices. Note that this procedure
amplifies systematic errors in pricing the debt. For example, suppose that
the model systematically underprices equity and overprices debt, as
functions of firm value. Then this procedure will make two compounding
errors. First, it will overestimate the value of the firm. Then it will
overestimate debt as a function of firm value. Hence it will overestimate
debt for both reasons. Counting each year from 1977 through 1981, and
counting each bond existing in each year for each of the 15 firms, we
solved numerically for prices of 163 bonds, as well as for equity values.
The next section describes our results.
6.4 Empirical Results
Table 6.2 summarizes the empirical results for the 163 bonds in the
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predicted price minus actual price, divided by actual price—is less than
1V2%. The standard deviation of the percentage pricing error is about
7%. The average absolute value of the percentage pricing error is about
6%. The accompanying histogram in figure 6.1 gives additional informa-
tion on these errors.
Although there is almost no systematic bias in pricing errors for the
sample as a whole, there might be systematic bias among subsets of bonds
that simply cancel out in the entire sample. We tested for this by dividing
the sample according to conventional classifications. For example, table
6.2 indicates that the model underprices bonds with high ratings (>A
rating) and overprices bonds with low ratings (< A rating) and that this
difference is statistically significant.
Statistical significance is measured by a difference of means test. This
test assumes that the two underlying populations are normally distributed
with the same variance. In addition it is assumed that the samples are
made up of independent draws. To the extent that the samples are not
made up of independent draws, the test is biased. It is likely that the
samples studied in this section have positively correlated errors; thus the
reports of statistical significance are biased upward.
Table 6.2 shows that the model underprices bonds on firms with low
variance rates and overprices bonds on firms with high variance rates.
All Bonds






M 1 TTTI FT I I I I I I I I M I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1
-.2 -.1 0
Percentage Error
I I I I I i
.1
i i i I I I i i i
.2 .3
Fig. 6.1 All bonds.256 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
The table indicates that the model underprices bonds with stated matu-
rities less than 15 years and overprices bonds with stated maturities
greater than 15 years. Of course, total variance equals the variance rate
multiplied by time. Hence overpricing high variance and long maturity
bonds may be two sides of the same coin. The table shows that the model
prices senior bonds correctly on average, but overprices junior bonds.
Finally, the table shows that the model underprices low coupon bonds
(coupon rate =s 7%) and overprices high coupon bonds (coupon rate >
7%).
In summary, the model tends to underprice safe bonds and overprice
risky bonds in a systematic way. This leads us to conclude that the usual
assumptions in the contingent claims valuation literature are violated in
some systematic way. Three assumptions are questioned in particular: (1)
the assumption of zero personal taxes, (2) the assumption of a constant
variance rate, and (3) the assumption of perfect antidilution protection.
The plan is as follows. First, there is a discussion of what kinds of pricing
errors would ensue from violation of each of these three assumptions.
Then empirical evidence is presented from the sample that is designed to
discriminate among pricing errors induced by violation of each of these
assumptions.
6.4.1 Personal Tax Assumption
According to assumption (A.I), which is standard in the contingent
claims valuation literature, there are no personal taxes. This implies that
investors capitalize ordinary income and capital gains in the same way.
However, conventional wisdom says that investors prefer capital gains to
ordinary income for tax reasons. Furthermore, Ingersoll (1976) finds that
inclusion of differential taxes on ordinary income and capital gains im-
proves the ability of the contingent claims valuation model to predict
prices for the income and capital shares of dual funds.
If differential taxes cause investors to capitalize ordinary income dif-
ferently from capital gains, then failure to include this in the model could
lead to overpricing bonds with higher current yields relative to bonds with
lower current yields. (See Ingersoll [1976, p. 110] for a careful discussion
of this issue.) First consider highly rated bonds. Recall that the interest
rates in the model are derived from a term structure for par government
bonds. Given the tax treatment of bonds trading in the secondary market,
high-quality discount bonds should be underpriced relative to high-
quality premium bonds. This is due to the fact that the IRS allows
investors to amortize secondary market premiums against interest in-
come while also allowing realized gains due to secondary market dis-
counts to be taxed at capital gains rates.
Another dimension of any tax effect has to do with risk. Consider257 Contingent Claims Valuation
low-quality par bonds versus high-quality par bonds (e.g., new issue
bonds on high-variance vs. low-variance firms). The expected capital loss
on the low-quality bonds is larger in absolute terms than the expected
capital loss on the high-quality bonds. Hence the low-quality bonds will
have a higher coupon rate than the high-quality bonds. Since the higher
taxes on the low-quality bond are ignored, any tax effect will cause
low-quality to be overpriced relative to high-quality bonds. In particular,
since government par bonds are perfectly safe, any tax effect will cause
corporate par bonds to be overpriced in general. Similar considerations
say that any tax effect will cause junior par bonds to be overpriced
relative to senior par bonds. And similar considerations also suggest that
any tax effect will cause longer maturity par bonds to be overpriced
relative to shorter maturity par bonds.
6.4.2 Variance Rate Assumption
According to assumption (A.4), which is standard in the contingent
claims valuation literature, the variance rate of firm value a
2 is a con-
stant. Empirical evidence for common equity suggests that its variance
rate goes up as its level goes down. Of course, this is consistent with a
constant variance rate for firm value—because of the possibility of lever-
age effects. However, it is also consistent with a nonconstant firm value
variance rate.
Suppose that the variance rate of firm value is not a constant, but rather
increases as firm value decreases. For example, the stochastic process for
firm value might belong to the constant elasticity of variance class. And
suppose that a constant variance rate is falsely assumed in estimating a
2.
What kinds of pricing errors would this include? These errors would be
similar in type to those induced by an underestimate of a variance rate
that is in fact constant. In other words, in either case the probability of
financial distress is significantly underestimated.
Underestimating the variance will not matter much for high-quality
bonds. But it will cause low-quality bonds to be overpriced by a signifi-
cant amount. Hence underestimating the variance will cause corporate
bonds to be overpriced in general and will cause low-quality bonds to be
overpriced relative to high-quality bonds. Similar considerations suggest
that underestimating the variance will cause junior bonds to be over-
priced relative to senior bonds and longer maturity bonds to be over-
priced relative to shorter maturity bonds.
6.4.3 Dilution Assumption
According to the perfect antidilution assumption in (A.8), which is
standard in the contingent claims valuation literature, no new bonds can
be issued until all old bonds have been extinguished. Furthermore,258 E. Philip Jones /Scott P. Mason /Eric Rosenfeld
according to the perfect liquidity assumption in (A.9), firms can simply
sell assets in order to make cash payouts. Hence in the model equity
maximizes its value by funding all cash payouts through asset sales.
However, firms which call bonds normally have the option to fund the
call by issuing new bonds with the same priority. Holding firm value
constant, this allows management to dilute any remaining bonds, as
compared to the model which allows for no dilution. On the other hand,
the model causes firm value to go down when bonds are called, as
compared to refunding with new bonds that keeps firm value constant.
Now suppose equity can choose between refunding and asset liquidation
to finance a call decision. The option to refund can have value to equity.
Failure to include the option to refund in our model will cause equity to
be underpriced and debt to be overpriced in general. Since the option to
refund has value because of the possibility of diluting existing debt, junior
debt will be overpriced relative to senior debt and longer maturity debt
will be overpriced relative to shorter maturity debt. In other words, debt
can be economically junior either because it is explicitly junior or because
it has a relatively longer maturity than other debt.
6.4.4 Empirical Evidence on Violation of These Assumptions
The empirical evidence tends to confirm the existence of a tax effect, a
variance effect, and a dilution effect. Table 6.2 gives evidence of a tax
effect. It shows that the model underprices discount bonds relative to
premium bonds. These results continue to obtain when examining only
high-quality bonds, where variance rate effects and dilution effects are
minimal. Table 6.2 gives further evidence of a tax effect. It shows that the
model overprices bonds with above-average coupon yields relative to
bonds with below-average coupon yields. (The median coupon yield in
the sample is approximately 9%.) Again, the results continue to obtain
when examining only high-quality bonds. Hence there is unambiguous
evidence for the existence of a tax effect.
There is also empirical evidence for a variance effect. A naive test for
the existence of a variance effect in whether bonds of firms with high
estimated variance rates are overpriced relative to bonds of firms with
low estimated variance rates, since risky bonds are more sensitive to
underestimating variance than safe bonds. Table 6.2 showed that this is
the case. However, this is a naive test, because a tax effect alone would
cause risky bonds to be overpriced relative to safe bonds. This is because,
everything else equal, risky bonds have higher expected capital losses
than safe bonds, which is compensated for by higher current yield. To test
for a variance effect independent of any tax effect, the sample is first split
according to high versus low current yield. This is done to control for the
tax effect. Then pricing errors are compared for bonds of high- versus

































'S 'a260 E. Philip Jones/Scott P. Mason/Eric Rosenfeld
suits. It shows that bonds of high-variance firms continue to be overpriced
relative to low-variance firms within each subsample, although the effect
is more pronounced for bonds with high current yield. Furthermore,
almost identical results hold when junior bonds are excluded from the
sample, to check against the possibility that variance only proxies for a
dilution effect. These results are interpreted as evidence for a variance
effect in addition to a tax effect.
Lastly, the question remains, Is there evidence for a dilution effect in
addition to a tax effect and a variance effect? A naive test for the
existence of a dilution effect is whether economically junior bonds are
overpriced—that is, either bonds which are explicitly junior or bonds that
are effectively junior because of their longer maturity—relative to eco-
nomically senior bonds. Table 6.2 showed that this is the case; junior
bonds are overpriced relative to senior bonds.
As before, this is a naive test, because either a tax effect or a variance
effect alone would cause junior bonds to be overpriced relative to senior
bonds. To get a more sophisticated test, the sample is first restricted to
bonds with high current coupon yield issued by corporations with high
variance rates, which tends to control for tax and variance effects. Table
6.3 shows the results. Although junior bonds continue to be overpriced
relative to economically senior bonds, the effect is not strong. Hence
there appears to be a dilution effect, but it is not as strong as the tax and
variance effects.
6.5 Conclusion
In this paper a theoretical model is derived for valuing claims in
realistic capital structures containing equity and multiple issues of call-
able nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, based on the usual
assumptions in the contingent claims valuation literature. This model is
tested on a number of bonds for 15 firms yearly from 1977 through 1982.
The predicted prices are not systematically different from actual prices
for the sample as a whole. However, predicted prices are systematically
different from actual prices for various types of bonds in the sample.
Evidence exists for a systematic tax effect and a systematic variance effect
in the results. There is also evidence for a less significant dilution effect
associated with the option to refund.
Establishing the empirical validity of contingent claims analysis as a
corporate liability pricing model is a large and complex task. A number of
theoretical and methodological problems must be addressed. For exam-
ple, as demonstrated in this paper, sinking funds and optimal call policies
for multiple bond capital structures warrant further theoretical study. It
has also been demonstrated that the detailed consideration of the interac-261 Contingent Claims Valuation
tion of multiple bond convenants can significantly increase the dimen-
sionality of the overall valuation problem. This underscores the need for
research into more efficient numerical analysis methods.
We view this paper as an important first step in establishing the empir-
ical validity of contingent claims analysis. Given the results of the paper,
current research is under way, using an expanded database, where the
problem formulation takes explicit account of personal taxes, the option
to refund, the cost of financial distress, and changing variance rates. Once
the results of this current research are known, a portfolio test will be
conducted to determine if market inefficiencies can explain any of the
discrepancies between the model prices and market prices.
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Comment Fischer Black
This is a costly model. It uses a lot of computer time. At the end of it all,
the average error in pricing bonds is 6%. I am surprised that Jones et al.
are able to create a model with such a large error. Surely an investment
banker can price a new bond more accurately than that. I am disap-
pointed, because I think that the best application of option theory is to
risky bonds. I hope that the best models will be more accurate.
Part of the problem is that the authors handicap themselves. They
don't allow themselves to use some of the information that an investment
banker is able to use. For example, they don't use information about the
current prices of comparable bonds.
Overall, I like the paper very much. I find it very stimulating. I think it
is the most thought-provoking paper on the valuation of corporate bonds
that I've seen. It is well written, too. There is math in it, but the math is
sufficiently hidden that it doesn't get in the way of understanding what the
paper is saying.
In trying to figure out how Jones et al. can be so far off in pricing the
bonds, I began to think about the assumptions they make. They are very
careful about certain assumptions, such as looking at the exact indenture
provisions on the bonds. There are other assumptions, though, that one
might take differently than they did. These assumptions might make a
difference in the values they get.
For example, they assume that a firm goes along, makes the sinking
fund and other payments on its outstanding bonds, and eventually pays
off its bonds. The firm ends up with no debt. In fact, firms don't seem to
do that. They go along for a while, paying off some of their existing debt.
But then they decide to make some new investments, so they issue more
debt. That affects the value of the debt that is already outstanding.
Putting this feature into their model could make a significant difference in
the values they get.
Another assumption that can be handled in different ways is the
assumption that firms behave in the way the model thinks is optimal. In
Ingersoll's study of convertible bonds, using methods like those in this
paper, it appears that firms call their bonds too late. They don't call them
at what seems to be the optimal time. Maybe the same thing applies to the
firms in this paper. Maybe they are not behaving in a way that the model
says is optimal. That may explain some of the differences here between
value and price.
I think that if you ask corporate treasurers how they decide what to do,
they will often give relatively unsophisticated answers. They will give you
rules of thumb that incorporate factors we think ought to be incorpo-
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rated, but usually not in an elegant way. It's conceivable to me that if we
are able to incorporate these rules of thumb in the model, we might get
better values.
Another important issue is the way one estimates the volatility of the
firm. With stock options, the volatility is perhaps the most important
input to the option valuation model. With corporate bonds, the volatility
may be less important, but it is important enough to make the difference
between a correct valuation and an incorrect valuation in most cases. I
believe that the procedure that is followed in this paper is essentially
equivalent to taking the actual historical volatility of the firm as the
estimated future volatility. That's going to give you incorrect volatility
estimates.
Moreover, the errors in estimating volatility will be correlated across
firms. There will be times when the volatility estimates are too low for
most firms, and other times when they're too high for most firms. In the
period covered by this paper I think the volatility estimates are too low,
since volatilities increased over that period.
Errors in estimating volatility are especially important when the au-
thors look at the pattern of errors across high- and low-volatility firms.
Firms that seem to have high volatility will often be firms for which we
have overestimated volatility, and firms that seem to have low volatility
will often be firms for which we have underestimated volatility. I think it
might be better if the authors used implied volatilities in place of histori-
cal volatilities. A firm's implied volatility is the volatility that gives the
right equity value when used in the model.
There's another point I can't resist making, because it's related to a
discovery Scott Mason reported in his dissertation. He found that there is
some uncertainty about how bonds will be handled in case of bankruptcy.
Suppose we are in a period where interest rates have risen. A firm with
low coupon bonds outstanding gets into bankruptcy. For one reason or
another, it has enough assets so that it could buy back at least one issue of
its bonds. The bonds are not due for several years. Does the firm have to
buy back the bonds at par, or can it buy them back at the present value of
a riskless bond with that coupon and other provisions? In this paper, the
authors assume that the bonds will be bought back at par, even when the
present value of a riskless bond with similar terms is below par. This
assumption is probably realistic, and probably won't make much differ-
ence in most cases anyway, but it will make some differences in the
values. The authors mention allowing for changes in the firm's volatility
as its value changes, and taking into account the fact that interest rates are
stochastic. These assumptions will make a difference, too, but I don't
think they will make as much of a difference as using implied volatilities
instead of historical volatilities and taking account of future debt issues by
the firm.